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Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression B. Early Planning for Invasion.
The Norwegian invasion is in one respect not a typical Nazi
aggression, in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark
upon it. The chief instruments of persuasion were Raeder and
Rosenberg; Raeder because he thought Norway strategically
important, and because he coveted glory for his Navy;
Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway,
which he sought to develop. And in the Norwegian, Vidkun
Quisling, Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column
agent.
The early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade Norway are
disclosed in a letter which Raeder wrote on 10 January 1944
to Admiral Assmann, the official German Naval historian (C-
66). It is headed "Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his
own information; not to be used for publications." The first
part deals with "Barbarossa" (the plan to invade Russia).
The next part is headed " (b) Weseruebung," which was the
code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. The
following is a pertinent passage from the letter:
"During the weeks preceding the report on 10 October
1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who,
in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the
importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by
Germany. I passed this letter on to CISKl (the Chief of
Staff of the Naval War Staff) for their information and
prepared some notes based on this letter for my report
to the Fuehrer, which I made on 10 October 1939, since
my opinion was identical with that of Admiral Carls,
while at that time the SKl was more dubious about the
matter. In these notes, I stressed the disadvantages
which an occupation of Norway by the British would have
for us -- control of the approaches to the Baltic,
outflanking of our naval operations and of air attacks
on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the
advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian
coast -- outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility
of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917-18.
Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were
considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in
the course of our correspondence thought that Narvik
could be excluded. The Fuehrer saw at once the sig-
[Page 737]
nificance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to
leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider
the question himself." (C-66)
This report of Raeder shows that the evolution of this Nazi
campaign against Norway affords a good example of the
participation of the German High Command in the Nazi
conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors.
Before this report of October 1939 was made to the Fuehrer,
Raeder sought a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On
3 October 1939, he made out a questionnaire headed, "Gaining
of Bases in Norway (extract from War Diary)" (C-122).It
reads: "The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it
necessary that the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible
of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities
of extending e operational base to the North. It must be
ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway
under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the
aim of improving our strategic and operational position. The
following questions must be given consideration:
"(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
"(b) Can bases be gained by military force against
Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out
without fighting?
"(c) What are the possibilities of defense after the
occupation?
"(d) Will the harbors have to be developed completely
as bases, or have they already advantages suitable for
supply position?"
("F.O.U.-boats" [a reference to Doenitz] "already
considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment
and supply bases or Atlantic U-boats to call at
temporarily.")
"(e) What decisive advantages would exist for the
conduct of the war at sea in gaining bases in North
Denmark, e.g. Skagen" (C-122)
A memorandum written by Doenitz on Norwegian bases
presumably relates to the questionnaire of Raeder, which was
in circulation about that time. Doenitz's document is
headed, "Flag officer Submarines, Operations Division," and
is marked "Most Secret." The subject is "Base in Norway."
Then there are set out "suppositions', "advantages and
disadvantages", and then 'conclusions. The last paragraph
(III) reads:
"The following is therefore proposed:
"(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:
[Page 738]
"a. Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air,
oxygen, provisions.
"b. Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an
encounter.
"c. Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews.
"d. Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S
units. "Secondly, establishment of the possibility of
supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative." (C-5)
In October 1939 Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian
aggression and had not yet committed himself to it. Raeder
persevered in pressing his point of view with regard to
Norway, and at this stage he found a powerful ally in
Rosenberg.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
Please double check the web address or use the search function on this page to find what you are looking for.
If you are certain you have the correct web address but are encountering an error, please
contact the site administration.
Thank you.
Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Norway & Denmark
(Part 2 of 10)
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